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THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT UNDER EMC'S POLICY
IT IS REQUIRED TO PAY THE COSTS AND FEES ASSESSED AGAINST ITS
INSURED RIMAR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, EVEN WHEN THE
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE NOT COVERED UNDER THE POLICY
Issue presented: The issue presented is whether the "supplementary payments" section of
the EMC lx)licy (Exhibit I, pp. 7, 8)1 entities the insured, Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI"), to
indemnification for any costs/fees assessed against it irrespective of coverage for compensatory
damages assessed. An Idaho case is good authority for the conclusion that, irrespective of coverage
for the assessed damages, the "supplementary payments" section of the EMC policy does provide
coverage for fees and costs ("supplementary payments"). Mutual ofEnumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho
1009,772 P.2d 216 (1989).
Mutual of Enumclaw is not distinguishable: Under the heading "Supplementary Payments

Coverages A and B" [Coverage A is for "property damage liability], the EMC policy recites: "We
will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate or settle, or any "suit" against an insured we
defend:. . .

(e) all costs taxed against the insured in the 'suit:"'. (Exhibit I, pp. 1,7,8).

In Mutual ofEnumclaw, relevant language of the Enumclaw policy stated: "Supplementary
Coverages 2. (Personal Liability Claims, Expenses) a. all expenses incurred by Company and costs
taxed against the insured in any suit defended by the Company". ld., 115 Idaho 1112. Mutual of
Enumclaw held that this coverage was "separate from and in addition to the basic policy coverage",

i.e" the absence of coverage with respect to assessed damages did not prevent this coverage for fees
and

~osts

from attaching.

A portion of the clerk's record is not paginated, including exhibits to the Affidavit of James
Reid. Unless otherwise noted, reference to "exhibits" is to those exhibits attached to the Reid affidavit.
I
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EMC argues that, coverage for assessed costs in its policy is contingent upon the existence
of coverage for damages" because the language 'supplementary payments' indicates that payments
will only be made in addition to payments on the underlying claim" . Appellant's Reply Brief, p.
2. The problem with that argument is that, as applied to the section of Enumclaw policy entitled
"Supplementary Coverages" the Mutual of Enumclaw Court should have found coverage did not
exist for fees because, borrowing EMC's argument, the language "supplementary coverages"
indicates that coverage for fees will exist only if there is coverage for the underlying claim. The
Court in Enumclaw found to the contrary.

115 Idaho at 1012, 1013. The Court noted that

"'Supplementary Coverages' implies that the provisions contained therein are separate from and in
addition to the basic policy coverage to the basic policy coverage . . ." Id, 115 Idaho at 1112.
There is good reason, semantically and logically, that the same interpretation should be made with
respect to the "Separate Payments" phrase in the EMC policy.
EMC's also argues that it does not have liability for Donnellys' fees, because that liability
is conditioned upon a suit existing and "suit" is defined as a "civil proceeding" . . . to which this
insurance applies" Exhibit I, p. 15. para. 18. The defect in this argument is that, by providing a
defense to RCI, EMC has conceded that the Donnellys had filed a civil proceeding "to which this
insurance applies".
It is notable as well that the EMC policy recites under "Supplementary Payments": "These
payments "vill not reduce the limits of insurance". Exhibit I, p. 8. In the Mutual of Enumclaw
policy, the Idaho Supreme Court observed similar language in the Enumclaw policy, i.e., "shall not
reduce the applicable limit ofliability", "implies that the provisions contained therein are separate
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from and in addition to the basic policy coverage . . and Enumclaw's obligation to pay such costs
is unaffected by the fact that the policy does not cover Oakes' [the insured] intentionally tortious

conduct".Id., 115 Idaho at 1012.
Mintarsih and Mutual ofEnumclaw concur that the duty to pay assessed costs and fees is coextensive with the duty to defend: In State Farm v. Mintarsih, 175 CaI.App. 274, 95 CaI.Rptr.3d 845
(App. 20(9), relied on by EMC, the Court re-affirmed earlier authority that the duty to pay costs and
fees under the "supplemental payments" coverage is triggered by the duty to defend, not the duty to

State Farm agreed to pay "expenses we incur and costs taxed against
an Insured in suits we defend," under the terms of the homeowners
policy. Under the terms of the umbrelIa polky, State Farm agreed to
pay "the expenses we incur and costs taxed against you in suits we
defend," provided that the claim or suit was not covered by any other
policy. These provisions made the insurer's obligation to pay an
award of costs against the insured dependent on the defense duty.
Courts have interpreted the word "costs" as used in such a provision
consistent with its use in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5,
subdivision (a)(1 0), which provides that attorney fees authorized by
contract, statute, or law are allowable as costs to the prevailing party
under section 1032. (Prichard v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (2000) 84
Cal. App. 4th 890, 912 (Prichard); Insurance Co. Of North America v.
National American Ins. Co. (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 195,206-207.)

2 In the Donnellys' opening brief, they cited Arrowood Indemnity v. Travelers Indemnity, 118
Cal.App. 1452, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 (2010) as being on point. It has been correctly observed by
oppusing counsel t~lat a petition for rehearing was granted in Arrowood and that case is not citable.
Counsel was misled by the page references in "Cal.App." and "Cal.Rptr." Donnellys' counsel withdraws
all reference to Arrowood and apologizes to the Court for this inadvertence. Donnellys' counsel has been
advised by handling counsel that Arrowood has settled.
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175 Cal. App. 4th at 284 (emphasis added).
The Mintarsih case (California) cited by plaintiffEMC is distinguishable by the underlying
facts: PlaintiffEMC places heavy reliance on State Farm v. Mintarsih, supra" and is asking this
Court to accept Mintarsih as presenting the same factual posture as the case at bench. (Reply Brief,
pp. 4 - 8). Unlike the case at bench, Mintarsih presents an issue of "mixed" claims, i.e., litigation
alleging undisputedly covered and uncovered claims with each respective claim having a separate
factual setting with the fee entitlement attaching solely to uncovered claims. In the case at bench,
both tort claims (covered) and contract claims (uncovered) carry a fee entitlement and arise out of
the same factual setting See footnote 3, infra.
Cmtrary to EMC' s brief (p. 7), the amended complaint neither alleges nor prays for bodily
injury damages. (Exhibit Band EMC's reservation of rights letter of September 7, 2007 at p. 3).
However, the amended complaint does allege a covered liability, i.e., that in constructing the
"addition", the underlying defendant RCI, "compromised the integrity of the original home", and
alleged loss of use. R. Exhibit B, para. lO(a). In its reservation of rights letters, EMC has conceded
that "physical injury to tangible property" is covered under the policy. See Exhibit I, (pp. 3, 4 of
September 5, 2006, letter and pp. 4,5 of September 7, 2007, letter). However, EMC erroneously
states in the letters that "there are no allegations of physical injury to tangible property". ld., p. 4 to
September 5, 2006, letter and p. 5 to September 7, 2007, letter. Ignoring the property damages
alleged in the amended complaint, EMC bases its proffered defense on the carbon monoxide
exposure to Kathy Donnelly described in the amended complaint (Exhibit B, para. lOCk), p. 5.), for
which damages are neither alleged nor prayed for.
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Again, EMC concedes that the amended complaint does not include a claim for bodily il1iury
(Ie!., Exhibit I, p. 3 of September 7,2007, letter). Nonetheless, EMC continues to hang its duty to

defend on this so-called bodily il1iury claim, Jd., p. 7, of September, 2007, letter.
Unlike the covered tort claims in Mintarsih, this covered liability (property damage) does
entitle the DonneHys to attorney fees from the insured/defendant,3 By erroneously advising this
Court that the allegations of the Donnellys' amended complaint include "bodily injury claims"
(which do not carry an attorney fee entitlement) EMC is wrongly attempting to place the case at
bench on all fours with Mintarsih (Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 6 - 8).
The Mintarsih Court ruled, with Solomnic fairness, that an insurance company which
provides a defense respecting certain covered claims (with no attorney fee entitlement) should not
be penalized for that defense by sticking it with attorney fees as to claims, in that same litigation,
which are not covered and which have a different factual basis. That is, the plaintiff's claimed
attorney fees in Mintarsih were only with respect to the wage and hour claim which had a separate
factual basis from the tort claims upon which the plaintiff prevailed. Jd., 175 Cal. App.

4th

at 287.

In the case at bench, because the allegations in the Amended Complaint sound both in tort
and contract, concerning the same factual basis, there was the "potential for coverage", and EMC
was obligated to defend and, by Mutual of Enumclaw, pay any attorney fees and costs assessed
against its insured, RCI.

3 Where tortious conduct results in property damage in a commercial setting, such conduct does
not preclude the plaintiffs entitlement to fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). City ofMcCall v. Buxton,
146 Idaho 656, 665,201 P.3d 629 (2009), citing Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, 143 Idaho 723, 728.
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THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT. UNDER THE EMC POLICY. EMC
HAD NO DUTY TO INDEMNIFY ITS INSURED FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF (GOOD) WORKMANSHIP
The inry did not find that RCI was negligent because the jury was never asked whether RCI
was negligent: Contrary to EMC's argument, the entire array ofjury questions need to be examined
to ascertain whether coverage issues have been clarified.. For example, the jury found there was a
contract breach but failed to award the Donnellys contract damages. Exhibit E, pp. 2, 7. The award
of damages for breach of the implied warranty, ($126,611.55) was not, therefore, an award of
contract damages. An instruction to the jury advised them that an implied warranty "is an obligation
imposed by the law when there has been no representation or promise." Exhibit D, Instruction No.
48. As noted below, the evolution of the concept of implied warranty is not rooted in principles of
contract law.
The Donnelly's recognize that, under the EMC policy, there was no coverage for damages
arising from breach of contract. However, there was coverage for loss of use of property that had
been "physically injured" and which property was outside the scope of the contract.

Stated

differently, if the property which was damaged was property being constructed by RCI, this damage
constitutes a breach of contract for which there is no insurance coverage. However, if there is
"physical injury to tangible property", the EMC policy does provide coverage. The reservation of
rights letters, assert, incorrectly, that "there are no allegations of physical injury to tangible property".
Exhibit I, p. 4, 2006 letter, p. 4, 5, 2007 letter. In fact, the Amended Complaint alleges that during
the construction of the "addition", "compromise[d]' "the integrity of the original home"". Exhibit
B, p. 3. para. 10(a). Included in the alleged bases ofliability was "negligence". Id
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Finally, EMC tests the patience of this Court when it argues in its Reply Brief:" . . . [T]he
JUry found no liability, and awarded no damages as to the tort claims based on fraud,

misrepresentation, nondisclosure, professional malpractice and negligence" . Id., p. 10. In fact, the
jury was never presented with the question whether RCI committed negligence. Notwithstanding
there were six jury questions regarding tort liability, the jury questions did not include a question as
to RCI's negligence, the only tort alleged for which there was coverage. That is, the jury was never
asked about RCI' s negligence. Exhibit E. Also, see infra re the failure ofEMC' s attorneys to request
an allocated verdict.
Whether the errors in the reservation of rights letters were inadvertent or intentional, EMC
is now invoking these letters as evidence of non-coverage: (1) Phantom "bodily injury" claim: EMC
now asserts that the reservation of rights letters were based upon Kathy Donnelly's exposure to
carbon monoxide fumes and the fact that bodily injury claims are covered under the EMC policy.
Hence, the reservation of rights letters and the defense provided to EMC. This justification does not
pass muster.
Fi~'st,

the Donnellys never made a claim for personal injuries. More to the point, and as

conceded by EMC, the Donnellys never alleged personal injuries in the complaint or amended
complaint and never included a prayer for damages for personal injuries. Exhibit I (September,
2007, letter, p. 3). Why provide RCI the defense?
Secondly, EMC acknowledges that the so-called personal injuries occurred in 2005, shortly
after the conclusion of RCI's work for the Donnellys. Id. p. 3. At the time EMC sent the 2007
reservation of rights letter, the purported claim for personal injuries had expired or was about to
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expire under Idaho Code 5-219(4) i.e., a two year limitations period of personal injuries. Why
provide RCl the defense?
Thirdly, in an attempt to make Mintarsih germane, EMC represents to this Court that Kathy
Donnelly's "bodily injury" claim was dismissed by the Court in the underlying action. Appellant
Brief, pp. 7, 8; Appellant Reply, p. 8. There was no motion to dismiss and there was no dismissal.
There was an Order in Limine cautioning the Donnellys not mention Kathy Donnelly'S sickness
during the underlying trial. Exhibit C, pp. 2, 3.
(2) EMC ignores covered property damage liability: Prior to the issuance of the second
reservation of rights letter (September 7, 2007) EMC gained knowledge that the RCI's construction
work on the new porch was creating structural problems with the "original home" which was not the
subject of the RCI contract. Just prior to the filing of the amended complaint, EMC's claims
adjusters noted:
Under para 10 it appear they are saying that the improperly const.
addition and porches has compromised the original structure in that
it is buckling walls, breaking windows, causing the roof line to sag
and other problems-this is new info [7111/07].
R.

D.

267
Two months after receiving the amended complaint and making the entry identified in the

preceding quotation, the September 2007, reservation of rights letter advised RCI: "Here there are
no allegations of physical injury to tangible property. . . . [T]here is neither property damage
nor an occurrence alleged with regard to construction defects". Exhibit I, September, 2007, pp. 5,

6.
A cynical person might speculate that EMC identified a phantom covered claim ("bodily
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injury") to justifY controlling RCI's defense, includingjury interrogatories, without disclosure of the
real :-eason for providing a defense ("property damage"). Whether inadvertent or otherwise, EMC,
through its defense counsel, failed to submit to the jury an allocated verdict, e.g., an interrogatory
as to whether RCI was negligent, which would have clarified the coverage issues without disclosing
to the jury the existence of insurance. The absence of an allocated verdict imposed upon RCI and
the Donnelly,> the impossible task of persuading the district court as to the jury's collective mindset
respecting the damages awarded for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship.
The damages awarded the Donnellys arise from a breach of the implied warranty of
workmanship and are not rooted in contract but, historically, arises by operation of law to insure a
fair result. Such remedy is not dependent on the existence of a promise or contract. Exhibit D,
Instruction Nos. 48, 49; Calamari on Contracts (Third Edition, West), §12-1, p. 19.
The dutv imposed upon an insurer with respect to allocated verdicts: In view of the jury
verdict against an award of contract damages and the failure of EMC, through retained defense
counsel, to request an allocated verdict, the compensatory damages should be deemed to be covered
damages lmder the EMC policy. EMC has provided a semantical discussion on the differences
between a "special" verdict and "general" verdict (Appellant Reply Brief, pp. 12-15). However,
EMC has failed to identifY in which particulars the underlying verdict was an allocated verdict,
addressing coverage issues and in which particulars EMC discharged its duty to the insured under
Buckley v. Orem, 112 Idaho 117, 730 P.2d 1037 (Ct. App. 1986). That is, EMC has failed to identifY
how the verdict shed light on the issue of insurance coverage. Buckley is not cited in its briefing.
In Buckley v. Orem, the Appellate Court analyzed "the interplay between a particular verdict
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form and the insurer's responsibilities when providing and directing the defense of its insured in the
injury action". Id 112 Idaho at 123. Both Buckley and its primary authority, Duke v. Hoch, 468
F.2d 973 (5 th Cir., 1972), dealt with ambiguities in an unallocated verdict having to do with the
available insurance limits. By contrast, the ambiguity in the Donnelly/RCI verdict concerned the
basis ofliability. However, in both Buckley/Duke and the case at bench, the insured or, alternatively,
the judgment creditor, is put to the same "impossible burden" of persuading a second court of what
the jury intended by its verdict:
[A]t the merits trial [the insurer's] counsel was required to make
known to the insured[s] the availability of a special verdict and the
divergence of interest between [the insureds] and the insurer
springing from whether damages were or were not allocated. The
record before us does not indicate that counsel did so.

Since on the present record the insurer failed to fully advise its
insureds of the divergence of interest between it and them with
respect to the verdict, the insureds [and the judgment creditor, Duke]
must, subject to the possibility noted in part III, infra, be freed of the
impossible burden (ifproofplaced on them.
Duke v. Hoch, 468 F.2d at 979,980 (emphasis added).

Disposition: In Duke and Buckley, the remedy for an unallocated verdict was to remand the
matter on the issue "whether the insurer's counsel, as counsel having the right to control the defense,
had adequately disclosed the situation to the insured's own counsel". Buckley, 112 Idaho at 124.
Upon remand, ruled the Buckley court, "further proof is necessary to show whether Nationwide [the
insurer] fuByand fairly handled its defense responsibilities to the Orems [the insureds] in light of
known rigks". Id.
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However, in Buckley, the Court madc it clear that in the future it adopted the Duke standard
respecting the conduct by an insurer: "Henceforth an insurer's duty in this regard shall be as
extensi ve as that outlined in Duke". Id, 112 Idaho at 125. In that case, "the district court was
instructecl that "[i]fthe insurer could not make such showing [that there was adequate disclosure to
the insured], then the district court was instructed to 'face the issue of attempting retrospectively to
allocate tl1e damages awarded.'" 468 F.2d at 984". Buckley, 112 Idaho at 124 (bracketed material
explanatory).
In the case at bench, there is no evidence that EMC complied with its duty, as mandated by
Buckley, in either its reservation of rights letters (Exhibit I) or elsewhere. That duty is described as
follows:
[W]hen the insurer sought to limit its liability to the coverage
provided by the contract, the insurer was required to show that it had
faithfully and fully performed its responsibilities to its insured by
disclosing the need for an allocated verdict.
Id., 112 Idaho at 124.

In addition, to EMC's failure to disclose to its insured the need for an allocated verdict, there
are other factors, as noted above, for concluding that breach of warranty damages are a covered
liability: (1) with a curious lack of candor, EMC based its duty to defend on a non-existent bodily
injili)' claim, ignoring the allegations of property damage covered under the policy; (Exhibit I); (2)
the breach of implied warranty claim (for which damages were assessed) is not rooted in contract
law (Exhibit D, Instruction Nos. 48 and 49); and (3) the jury found no contract damages (Exhibit E,
p. 7), which damCl.ges, in any event, are not a covered liability.
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UNDER IDAHO CODE §41-1839, THE DONNELLYS ARE THE
PREVAILING PAR TIES BECAUSE THE AMOUNT A WARDED BY THE
TRIAL COURT WAS GREATER THAN THE AMOUNT TENDERED BY EMC
Preliminary note: The district court's analysis of the proof ofloss issue and Donnellys' status
as non-insureds assumes their status as prevailing parties. R. pp. 541-547. In order for the district
court to be reversed on this point requires a showing of an abuse of discretion.
Issues pertaining to proof ofloss and Donnellys' status as a non-insured: Following EMC"s
suit, the Donnellys reference their Respondents' Brief, pages 34 through 39. It should be noted that
the underlying judgment creditor (not the insured) in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, supra, had
standing to recover portions ofthe judgment, including attorney fees pursuant to § 41-1839. Id., 115
Idaho at 1011, 1015. Also, Mutual of Enumclaw held that, where the insurer denies liability, it
waives the requirement that proof ofloss be furnished as a prerequisite to recovery of attorney fees.

Id 115 Idaho at 10 15.
EMC erroneously applies the "prevailing party' standard under Rule 54(d)((1) rather than
the applicable standard under Idaho Code §41-1839: The authorities cited in EMC's Reply Brief
pertain to the trial court's application of the "prevailing party" concept as set forth in Rule 54(d)(1),
LR.C.P., the awarding of fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§12-120 and 12-121, e.g., Joseph

CL. U Assoc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (Ct.App. 1990). See Reply brief, p. 19.
In the context ofIdaho Code §41-183 9, in order to be awarded attorney fees, the claimant
need only recover more than was tendered by the insurance company in order to be the "prevailing
party":
When an insurer fails to tender the amount justly due under an
insurance policy, within thirty days after receiving proof ofloss. I.C.
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§41-1839(1) mandates an award of reasonable attorney fees to the
insured. To be entitled to such an award, consequently, an insured
must prevail. [cases cited] However, the il13ured need not obtain a
verdict for the full amount requested. The insured need only be
awarded an amount greater than that tendered by the insurer.
Slaathaug v. Allstate Insurance Co., 132 Idaho 705, 711, 979 P.2d 107 (1999).

EMC cites Slaathaug in connection with a Rule 59( e) motion, not in connection with
Donnellys' attorney fee entitlement.
EMC initiated this action during the underlying litigation between the Donnellys and RCI,
and this declaratory judgment action has been ongoing since that time. It is undisputed that the
amount awarded to the Donnellys, i.e., $296,933.89 in costs and fees assessed against the insured
RCI, had never been tendered by EMC, the insurer. Hence the DonneUys' entitlement to attorney
fees and costs.
IN THE EVENT THE DONNELLY'S ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY
FEES IN THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS. THEY
ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON THIS APPEAL
In Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins., supra, the Supreme Court declined to address attorney fees on
appeal because that decision had not yet been reached by the district court. Depending on the
decisio:i1 as to an award of attorney fees in the proceedings below, such decision will determine
whether the insured is entitled to fees on appeal.
. . . [T]here have been no findings as to whether § 41-1839(1) mandated an award
offees in the litigation below. Absent such a finding, it would be premature to award
fees under this section on appeal. Whether the Slaathaugs are entitled to attorney
fees below will determine whether they are entitled to fees for defending this appeal.
CF. JR. Simplot Co. V Enviro-Clear Co., Inc., [132] Idaho [251],970 P.2d 980
(1998) (remanding a case for a new trial and holding a request for attorney fees on
appeal under § 12-120(3) to be premature since neither party could have yet
prevailed).Id,
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J 32 Idaho at 711 (emphasis added)(bracketed material explanatory).
CONCLUSION
EMC's obligation to pay costs and fees assessed against its insured. Contrary to EMC's
asse!iion, Mt!tual a/Enumclaw holds that EMC is required to pay such fees and costs by reason of
the "Supplementary Payments" section of its insurance policy. Slate Farm v. Minitarsih, although
djstinguishable from the case at bench on the facts corroborates Mutual a/Enumclaw, on this point,
i. e., the obligation to pay costs/fees arises where the insurer has a duty to defend. State Farm v.
Mintarsih, 175 Cal.App.4th at 285.

In its attempt to characterize Mintarsih as being on point, EMC wrongfully attributes to the
underlying amended complaint an allegation of "bodily injury". In its reservation of rights letters,
EMC consedes that the pleadings do not include such a claim. Exhibit 1. The district court in the
underlying litigation did not "dismiss" a bodily injury claim; rather it ordered that the Donnellys
could not reference Kathy Donnelly's sickness during trial. Exhibit C, pp. 2, 3.

EMC has

erroneously represented to the Court that the claim was "dismissed". Appellant Brief, pp. 7, 8;
Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 8.
EMC's obligation to pay the underlying damage award: It cannot be seriously disputed that
the underlying verdict is not an allocated verdict. The closest the verdict comes to clarifYing the
coverage issues is the answer that there are no contract damages, which is not a covered liability.
Exhibit E, p. 7.

Buckley v. Orem places a burden on the insurer to "disclose the need for an

allocated verdict", Id, 112 Idaho at 124.
Thert is no evidence that such disclosure occurred. It is certainly not included in the
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reservation of rights letters (Exhibit I). This omission coupled with EMC's phantom "bodily injury"
claim as a pretext for providing a defense as well as jury verdict of no contract damages requires a
conclusion that the implied warranty of workmanship damages is a covered liability for which the
insurer EMC is obligated to indemnifY RCI for the benefit of the Donnellys.
The Donnellys are entitled to attorney fees both in the district court proceedings and in this
~<!l:

The Donnellys are the prevailing parties respecting their claim for attorney fees and costs

assessed against the insured RCI in the underlying litigation. This "prevailing party" status is
acquired under Idaho Code §41-1839 because the Donnellys prevailed respecting the assessed
fees/costs which amount was never tendered by EMC. Slaathaug v. Allstate, supra.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of December, 2011.

Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Appellant
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 19th day of December, 2011, I caused to be served two
true and correct ~0pies of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Law Chartered
455 South Third Street
P.O. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773
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